

Is There a Need For a Joint Reserve Components Command?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Cole
United States Army Reserve



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Is There a Need For a Joint Reserve Components Command?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Cole United States Army Reserve				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel James Eric Morrison Strategic Studies Institute				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6,462					
14. ABSTRACT <p>With the fiscal challenges facing the nation and in light of the budget and manpower cuts across the Department of Defense, the military will have to plan on doing more with less. Reliance upon the RC will be greater now than ever before. Not only will the Military Services rely more on the RC but also on Joint operations. The purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of establishing a Joint Reserve Components Command (JRCC), which would exercise organizational and functional control over the reserve component elements of the United States Armed Forces. This paper will examine the history of the Reserve Components, challenges with joint interoperability and offer an option to overcome those challenges. Further, the proposed organizational structure preserves the integrity and unique abilities of each of the disparate elements.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reorganization of the Reserve Components Headquarter					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Is There a Need For a Joint Reserve Components Command?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Cole
United States Army Reserve

Colonel James Eric Morrison
Strategic Studies Institute
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Is There a Need For a Joint Reserve Components Command?

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 34

Word Count: 6,462

Key Terms: Reorganization of the Reserve Components Headquarter

Classification: Unclassified

With the fiscal challenges facing the nation and in light of the budget and manpower cuts across the Department of Defense, the military will have to plan on doing more with less. Reliance upon the RC will be greater now than ever before. Not only will the Military Services rely more on the RC but also on Joint operations. The purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of establishing a Joint Reserve Components Command (JRCC), which would exercise organizational and functional control over the reserve component elements of the United States Armed Forces. This paper will examine the history of the Reserve Components, challenges with joint interoperability and offer an option to overcome those challenges. Further, the proposed organizational structure preserves the integrity and unique abilities of each of the disparate elements.

Is There a Need For a Joint Reserve Components Command?

...propelled by decades of operational experience, the U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice, though we must always remain vigilant against backsliding on that front.

—Secretary of Defense Gates.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen commented, "We could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces."¹ With the fiscal challenges facing the nation and in light of the budget and manpower cuts across the Department of Defense, the military will have to plan on doing more with less. Reliance upon the RC will be greater now than ever before. Not only will the Military Services rely more on their Reserve Components, but also on Joint operations. "Jointness" is a process that supports cooperation among Military Services. Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness.² Joint Publication 1-02 describes "joint" as "activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate."³ Are the Reserve Components ready for this task of "Jointness"? Achieving unity of effort under these circumstances is intensive and is built upon personal relationships and training. This paper will first review the budget environment, then examine the history of the Reserve Components, its past challenges in particular with joint interoperability that can be illustrated by the following two cases: Hurricane Katrina and The Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force and The 385th Transportation Battalion Mobilization to Kuwait to support the Port of Ash Shuaybah . Finally, the paper will offer an option for overcoming those challenges. The purpose of this paper is to present an option which would exercise organizational and functional control over the Reserve

Component (RC) elements of the United States Armed Forces. If this option is implemented, additional studies will be required to examine the feasibility of the proposal.

The Budget Environment

Amidst the current fiscally constrained environment all uniformed services must make budget decisions. According to Admiral Mullen, the greatest risk to our national security is our nation's debt.⁴ The United States is facing enormous budget deficits and challenges within every department of the government. In 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the Pentagon to find 100 billion dollars of savings during that budget year to help reduce the national debt.⁵ The Department of Defense (DOD) must look to find greater efficiencies by reducing personnel and eliminating redundancy. The Reserve Components (RC) provide one area where DOD can easily find these efficiencies. The RCs over the decades have evolved into competitive staffs competing for resources. These six components are sometimes treated as a quasi-organization to address concerns and issues they have in common, such as accession authorities, training categories, and pay and retirement. However, their primary allegiances are to their parent Services, and each is quite different from one another in composition and culture. These differences may stem from the proportion of the Service force structure they provide and the way in which their parent Services choose to use them.⁶

The RC should find ways to examine how alternate organizational structures and integration approaches may result in efficiencies and enhanced capabilities. There is currently a great deal of duplication within the RC's headquarters. In each of the RC's Battalion level and above, the primary staff and special staff are almost duplicates. Throughout, the RCs all have Personal, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planners as

well as lawyers, Public Affairs and Chaplains. The majority of professional development schools available to the RC's parallel the Active Component in teaching Jointness. Many of the RC's deployed over the last 12 years worked on many of the JTFs and Joint HQ's and are extremely competent in working in the Joint environment and could easily transition to a RC focused Joint HQ.

The RCs are comprised of two types of forces- the National Guard and the Federal Reserve forces - and seven different military organizations: the Army National Guard (ARNG), the Air National Guard (ANG), the Army Reserve (USAR), the Navy Reserve (USNR), the Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), the Air Force Reserve (USAFR), and the Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). Opportunities for cost savings may exist by consolidating at the headquarters level and centralizing functions.

History of the Reserve Components

The militia is a concept that predates the Constitution of the United States. The idea for it was embedded in English common law and became a part of colonial and military custom in the U.S. as well.⁷ Beginning with the Constitution in 1787, and continuing throughout our history, the militia has been codified in federal and state laws.⁸ The constitutional basis for the modern militia system is found at Article I, Section 8, which states:

The Congress shall have Power...; to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, The Militia and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,...

Before the Revolutionary War, each of the colonies had an organized militia with the primary mission of maintaining public peace and protecting the colony from raids by Indians and any other such threats to security.⁹ As the Revolutionary War began, most of these militiamen, popularly referred to as Minutemen, became the nucleus of the Continental Army, the forerunner of the federal United States Army. Upon the conclusion of the war, with independence secured, the Continental Army was disbanded and the only military forces maintained were the independent militias of several states and a few federal guards that were kept on to provide maintenance services at Fort Duquesne and West Point.¹⁰

Recognizing the need for the establishment of troops in the service of the United States, the First Congress implemented The Act of 1789, effective September 29, 1789.¹¹ This was the statutory birth of the Regular Army of the United States of America, a completely federal standing army, whose primary purpose was to overcome the serious military weaknesses that had been so obvious under the articles of Confederation before the adoption of the Constitution. States remained free to maintain their own militias, which they did.¹² It wasn't until 1792, with adoption of the Federal Militia Act, that Congress attempted to codify a federal policy regarding the militia.¹³ Even though the Act did little more than require a continuing census to establish a roll of ready reserves available to be called into federal service, it did require a yearly muster of and a uniform age for military obligation (every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five), outlined tactical organization for states, mandated specific equipment requirements for individuals, and presumed that each state would form company-size districts.¹⁴ District Captains were to be responsible for

enrolling all obligated men residing within their district and were to make provisions for the annual muster.¹⁵ The major flaws of the law were that it failed to establish a means to ensure that states followed these guidelines and provided no federal funding for militia activities. Thus, the states were left to rely on pre-Revolution militia practices, and the law did little more than create a massive military manpower bookkeeping system rather than an effective, in-place nationwide reserve force.¹⁶

While the Act of 1789 authorized the President to draft the militia into federal service,¹⁷ this proved to be unnecessary because large numbers of state units volunteered to enlist into federal service when needed, and were simply placed on the rolls of the federal forces. In this manner, units ranging from single companies to entire regiments were employed for combat in various conflicts, from the War of 1812 through the Spanish-American War in 1898.¹⁸ Notwithstanding honorable service and notable actions by individual militia soldiers, the general performance of the militia during the War of 1812 could be described, at best, as disappointing. Some units simply performed poorly while others flatly refused to carry out the orders given them.¹⁹ With the challenges that mobilization and deployment of the militia brought to light, it was obvious that the Militia Act of 1789 had failed to develop or sustain a formidable national militia which could be depended upon during wartime.²⁰

With no adequate alternative to reliance on citizen-soldiers, the nation faced dire circumstances in the years leading up to the Civil War. Because state funding for militia units was limited or nonexistent, in many instances the militia had devolved into little more than social entities. In many units, members were required to pay dues in order for the unit to remain in existence. In addition to dues, members often resorted to such

fund-raising activities as balls, dinners, and theater.²¹ These units functioned more like a fraternity than a military organization and, not surprisingly, they were more or less militarily ineffective. Thus, thanks to the failure of states to finance their militias, they had managed to cripple the effectiveness of their military systems.²² With the election as President of Abraham Lincoln in November, 1860, and the threat of Civil War looming large, state legislatures, in both the north and south, began appropriating funds to reinvigorate their militias. Governors found the necessary funds to organize, train, and equip their volunteer units.²³ Throughout 1861, both the Union and the Confederacy were feverishly recruiting, arming, and equipping their armies; however, the requirement for mass armies and central allocation of manpower overwhelmed states' capabilities and, for the first time in 1862, the Confederacy, followed shortly by the Union, adopted conscription. For the first time, the federal governments (Confederate and Union) became the dominant players in military manpower mobilization.²⁴

Following what can only be considered, by and large, successful service during the Civil War, state militia units returned to state control – at least in the northern states – and, despite challenges faced by Reconstruction in the south (disestablishment of Southern States' militias), shifted from disparate, disorganized forces to organized, funded, and well regulated institutions by the early twentieth century. Although the state militias would no longer be the principal form of national land defense, having ceded that role to the standing federal army, state militia organizations not only survived the Civil War years, they entered the most transformative period of their history up to that point in time.²⁵

The Spanish-American War provided state militias an opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness as a part of the nation's fighting force. The militias strove to emphasize their historic function as a wartime reserve and argued they could do more than just perform the role of state conflict intervention.²⁶ In the eyes of active duty soldiers, the part-time soldiers served with honor, but not necessarily distinction. However, the militia's achievements during the war increased their standing in the eyes of the American people. Even though they played only a minor role in Cuba, militia forces were instrumental in the occupation of Puerto Rico and played a major role in the suppression of the Filipino insurrection. State units formed the majority of land forces in these campaigns and performed admirably. Upon their return home in 1899, enthusiastic crowds greeted the part-time soldiers to welcome them back.²⁷

Following the war, militia forces immediately reconstituted their state units and renewed a campaign for federal recognition as a military reserve during times of war. Newly appointed Secretary of War, Elihu Root, sought to address the militia's concerns and redefine the state militia's relationship with the federal government.²⁸ As a result, his proposals culminated with the enactment of the Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act).²⁹ This act repealed the Militia Act of 1792 and divided the militia into two factions, the Reserve Militia (defined as all able bodied men between the age of eighteen and forty-five) and the Organized Militia, which for the first time codified a federal status for state militias³⁰ The act also required the Organized Militia of the states to conform to Regular Army organization and standards within five years. It dramatically increased federal funding of the militias, in return for which militia units were to be subject to inspection by Regular Army officers and were to open their account books to

federal auditors. The Act also required units to attend twenty-four drills and five days of annual training a year, and, for the first time provided for pay for annual training.

Furthermore, the act established that the War Department would fund attendance of Organized Militia officers at Army schools. Perhaps the most significant item contained in the bill was the fact that it labeled the state Organized Militia “National Guards”, the first statutory use of that term (even though it was unofficially in use in some states), giving rise to the assertion that this Act was the birth certificate of the National Guard. Finally, the Dick Act established, for the first time, a central office, in Washington, DC, to handle National Guard affairs, which was the predecessor of today’s National Guard Bureau.³¹

The United States Army Reserve traces its beginnings to April 23, 1908, when Congress passed Senate Bill 1424. This Act authorized the Army to establish a reserve corps of medical officers, and provided that the Secretary of War could order these officers to active duty during times of national emergency. This was the nation’s first totally federal reserve component. Four years later, a provision of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created the Regular Army Reserve.³² This Reserve contains 45 percent of the Army's Combat Service Support units, 30 percent of its combat support units, and 100 percent of its training and exercise divisions.³³ The National Defense Act of 1916 established, by statute, the Army Officers Reserve Corps, the Army Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The following year, the Medical Reserve Corps was merged into the Army Officers Reserve Corps.³⁴

The Air National Guard was officially established in law as a separate reserve component on September 18, 1947.³⁵ The Air National Guard (ANG) serves as the Air

Force's unit-based reserve. The Air Force Reserve began as the Army Air Forces Reserve Program in 1946. With the establishment of an independent United States Air Force in September, 1947, Air Force Reserve personnel and units were placed under the Continental Air Command and the Air Force Reserve was established and activated as a Separate Operating Agency (SOA) on June 21, 1968. Following several reorganizations, it was re-designated as Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and its status changed to a Major Command (MAJCOM) of the United States Air Force on February 17, 1997.³⁶

The modern Naval Reserve Force was officially created on March 3, 1915, although some state naval militias had existed as far back as colonial times. Navy reservists have served in all conflicts the nation has endured, and in fact, served aboard privateers before and during the Revolutionary War. The name was changed in 2005 to United States Navy Reserve.³⁷ Approximately 30 percent of the naval war-fighting force resides in the Navy Reserve.

The United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) was established by the Navy Appropriations Act of 1916, effective August 29, 1916. The USMCR is the smallest and most specific of the various Service RCs. Today it is more commonly known as Marine Forces Reserve, and is the largest command in United States Marine Corps.³⁸ The primary mission of the Marine Reserves is to provide augmentation and reinforcement to the active marine forces in time of war, national emergency or contingency operations.³⁹


Today, all the Reserve Components (RC) provide capabilities that meet the nation's requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Each branch continues to

have reserve forces that can be called upon to fill the needs of their active duty counterpart. During the Cold War the RC operated as a strategic force in reserve. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war, the Reserves and National Guard entered a new era and transformed from a strategic force to an operational force. This new era was a result of the persistent conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, almost 800,000 RC Service members were mobilized. The RC have contributed greatly to the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Addressing Joint Interoperability Issues

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) significantly revised the command structure of United States military forces and the manner in which they operated together. This legislation introduced the most sweeping changes to the Department of Defense since it was established in the National Security Act of 1947.⁴⁰ “The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 identified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces.”⁴¹ The act also provided a Joint Staff which is under the direction of the CJCS.

Furthermore, the act increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and streamlined the military chain of command (COC). The COC runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders bypassing the service chiefs.



The Joint Staff performs duties prescribed by the Chairman and assists other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an attempt to alleviate problems caused by inter-service rivalry that was so evident during the Vietnam War, the disastrously failed Desert One hostage rescue mission in 1980, and in the invasion of Grenada in 1983. It was painfully evident that the Department of Defense throughout was suffering from all manner of this lack of interoperability – communications, procurement and logistics systems, differing refueling systems, and an almost total lack of knowledge among the senior levels of command of the tactics and doctrine each of the other services employed during wartime operations. These shortcomings resulted in a division of effort,

the inability to profit from economies of scale, and inhibited the development of modern warfare doctrine. Perhaps no better example of this can be found in a snapshot of the situation on the ground in Iran in April 1980. The military had six months to organize, plan, and train for this mission and yet, no existing joint organization was capable of conducting such a raid. There was no useful contingency plan, no relevant cross-service experience. The joint task force commander, MG James Vaught, was a distinguished Army combat veteran but he was aboard a Navy vessel at sea and had no experience in operations with other services. The participating service units trained separately and only met for the first time in the desert in Iran. Even there, they did not establish command and control procedures or clear lines of authority. Colonel James Kyle, an Air Force officer, was the senior commander at Desert One and recalled that, “there were four commanders at the scene without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan, not even a designated location for the commander.”⁴²

Goldwater-Nichols changed the way the services interact. The restructuring afforded a combination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement, and the elimination – or at least a significant reduction – of inter-service rivalry between commanders. It also provided unity of command and assignment of assets (air, land, and naval) tailored to achievement of the objective. The first successful test of Goldwater-Nichols came in 1991, with Operation Desert Storm, where it functioned exactly as planned, allowing the U.S. commander, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, to exercise full control over Army, Air Force and Navy assets without having to negotiate with the individual service Chiefs of Staff.⁴³ Unfortunately, the RCs were largely overlooked in this legislation, other than establishing a requirement for RC officers to

receive education and experience in joint service, similar to policies established for officers on the active duty list.⁴⁴ Is now the time for the Reserve Components to jump on board and eliminate Service parochialism and build a mindset of “jointness?”

Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina was the largest physical disaster in United States modern history. In August 2005 Hurricane Katrina moved into the Gulf of Mexico as a massive storm. Hurricane Katrina had winds that exceeded 230 miles with speeds up to 175 miles. The storm impacted over 93,000 square miles as it made landfall.⁴⁵ Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) was activated on August 30 to coordinate support active-duty support for disaster relief efforts in the hurricane’s aftermath. Command and Control (C2) is imperative in all military operations and often is the difference between success and failure. JTF-Katrina did not provide adequate unity of command and C2 of the federal or state forces. JTF-Katrina did not account for all of the tasks and missions the military needed to provide and had little provision for integrating Title 10 and Title 32 component forces or address the critical questions of force integration, C2, and division of tasks between National Guard resources under state control and federal resources. During President Bush’s speech to the nation on 16 September, 2005, he stated:

Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States military, the National Guard, Homeland Security, and state and local governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government, was not well coordinated and was overwhelmed in the first few days.⁴⁶

There were reserve forces from all branches of service who conducted relief operations on the ground. Fixed wing aircraft crewed by reserve component Naval Aviators began conducting relief/rescue missions immediately after Hurricane Katrina hit landfall. Marine Reservists also played a critical role in the search and rescue

operations. The 4th Battalion, 14th Marines searched for survivors and victims of the storm. The 920th Air Force Reserve Command in Patrick Air Force Base utilizing their helicopters. Bravo Company, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment was the first Army Reserve unit called up to support Hurricane Katrina relief operations. This unit provided assistance to search and rescue operations.⁴⁷ The Army Reserve also provided several transportation companies to support Hurricane Katrina.

Numerous lessons learned were identified from Hurricane Katrina. One issue identified was the question of command and control (C2) between Army National Guard (ARNG) forces and federal forces. There was no clear plan identified for C2. There was confusion as to who would take ownership of the military response plan, was the ARNG, active or mobilized forces in charge? It was hard for JTF-K to maintain accountability of the mass number of forces that were on the ground. The military had not plan for the integration of the large number of troops from the different units which made it hard to assign tasks and missions during the operation.⁴⁸ This lack of clarity led to operations that were not as efficient as it should have been. The dual chain of command between federal and state troops resulted in a failure of unity of effort between the two forces. Since no single commander was in charge of forces, this caused duplicated efforts, delays, and gaps in support provided by the forces.

During Hurricane Katrina there was one option that could have alleviated some of the problems however it was only a concept at the time. Navy Adm. James A. "Sandy" Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created the dual-status commander concept while he was NORTHCOM commander.⁴⁹ The dual-status commander is a National Guard general officer who has command and control over

Title 10 and Title 32/state active-duty troops. The commander will have a Title 10 deputy commander and staff members assigned to provide assistance. These members are usually volunteers from the NORTHCOM staff identified at the last minute. Super storm Sandy provided the first unplanned, no-notice implementation of the dual-status construct. There is no way to gage if this command was a success until all of the lessons learned have been identified, but it does provide the opportunity to question if the military response could have been more effective. Could this have been alleviated by a Joint Reserve Component Component (JRCC) already in place? A JRCC would provide one headquarters responsible for all facets of the Joint force. The CMD would be responsible for joint reserve force requirements and the staff would ensure a means for integrating future crisis response and provide total situational awareness of all forces.

Bringing the RCs fully into the Goldwater-Nichols concept can be achieved by implementation of the JRCC. All of the beneficial effects can be obtained and the current parochial nature of the various RC commands reduced or eliminated. Full, or at least nearly full, interoperability is an achievable goal. The additional opportunities for RC officers and senior enlisted members to obtain joint assignments and training should make such a transition considerably more attractive to all.

The Port of Ash Shuaybah

The Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force (NAVELSF) and the 385th Transportation Battalion (TC BN) were mobilized to operate the Port of Ash Shuaybah. The 385th TC BN was mobilized in late 2003 while the NAVELSF was mobilized in January 2004. Operating the Port of Ash required the use of joint forces since at the time the critical assets were not available from one service. The mission at the port was

to help move everything coming and going as part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom II force rotation plan. The Army and Navy reservists kept tracked of it all in hundred-acre storage lots. Both units had never met or worked with one another prior to their deployment. The mission however was a success but it was not as a result of planning. LTC Clark Summers, battalion commander of the 385th TC BN commented “This has worked out great.” “It’s the first time units from two different services have been tied together so closely.”⁵⁰ However there was a different point of view from the navy perspective. Senior Chief Boatswain’s Mate Jack Dietenhofer commented working with the army presented challenges which included the command structure, common language and culture. For example, the Navy leadership might complement a sailor for a job well done with the words “Bravo Zulu”. If these words were heard by a Soldier, it might be interpreted as poor performance. By having one organization as a single source for identifying requirements and sourcing requirements from the start could have alleviated these challenges.

Option

Currently there is no single organization that has responsibility for training, recruiting or to serve as advisor of roles and missions for the reserve components. A proposed option is to establish a Joint Reserve Components Command (JRCC) from the existing Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, which would be abolished. The JRCC will be made up of the following: Army National Guard; Air National Guard; US Army Reserve Command; US Air Force Reserve Command; US Navy Reserve Force; and, US Marine Forces Reserve. Each reserve component would maintain command and control of their respective forces. Merging the headquarters would achieve greater oversight and reduce layers of headquarters management. An integrated staff could

better adapt to changing missions, and doing so would produce a reduction in force size by eliminating duplicative staff, and allow for further decreases in staffing size for common support functions. For example, under the JRCC, you would recognize efficiencies by consolidating the Public Affairs (PAO), Chaplains and Legal (SJA) office.

The organization of the JRCC would be similar to the primary and special staffs of the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) that was disestablished. This headquarter would be responsible for enhancing joint interoperability within the Reserve Components The proposed Joint Reserve Component Command organization is depicted in the diagram below:




Figure 2: Joint Reserve Component Command Organization

The Headquarters' primary responsibility is to ensure personnel readiness, policy, planning and training of the reserve component. It would also be the Appropriations sponsor for the six Reserve Components. The Commander (4-star) – currently Chief, National Guard Bureau - would represent the entire spectrum of reserve

component forces rather than only the National Guard. The Commander would recommend the use of joint reserve forces in operations and speak for the reserve component as a whole in high level interagency meetings. The position should rotate amongst the Reserve Components, similarly to the manner of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commander of the JRCC will be the principal advisor to the Service Chiefs of the Armed Forces, while the 3-star commanders' responsibilities are to organize, train, and equip all Reserve units around the world. The 3-star commanders would retain their respective operational headquarters but at a reduced manning level to be determined later.

The staff organization would be categorized as a joint staff, special staff, or personal staff. The joint staff would be comprised of seven directorates, from J1 through J8. General officers or Senior Executive Service civilians would head each of the directorates. The staff will execute the responsibilities of the commander by overseeing, developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans. **J-1 Manpower and personnel.** The J1 would be responsible for manpower and personnel support to the staff and outside agencies. It would ensure the readiness and sustainability of the reserve component by developing personnel policies. Its mission is to develop and manage programs and policies that assure wide unity of purpose and effort to maximize the readiness and operational capabilities of the Reserve Component. **J-2 Intelligence/J-6 Command, control, communications and computer (C4).** This directorate serves as the advisor for all Intelligence, Signal, Information technology and management matters. The Intelligence directorate would be the focal point for crisis intelligence support to the Reserve Component. The J6 Directorate provides central authority for all related

program policy, planning and execution to include management of all information systems. **J-3 Operations Training and Force Management.** The J3 is responsible for strategic integration of all Reserve Component operations within the Department of Defense and Joint Staffs to maintain the Reserve Component's (RC) position as a key and vital component in the pursuit of National Strategic Policy. The directorate consists of Operations, Training, and Force Management Divisions. This directorate would be the single source for identifying requirements, sourcing and mobilizing all RC forces for OCONUS and CONUS operations. The main task of the J-3 Directorate is: **Joint Force Provider.** As the RC Joint Force Provider, the JRCC will identify and assign forces to capabilities identified by the combatant commanders. As a single focal point for the RC, this will ensure an integrated organized team is prepared to deploy. **J-4 Logistics Directorate.** This Directorate will coordinate Service programs for all the Reserve Components and ensure all forces and materials are prepared for their missions. **J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy.** This Directorate develops and coordinates strategic plans and policy with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staffs and agencies to ensure trained and ready Reserve Component Forces support the Department of Defense (DOD) missions. **J-7 Joint Development and Doctrine Training.** The Directorate is the coordinator of the military's joint training effort. It directs all aspects of training to ensure properly trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units are available to the Combatant Commander. **J8 Force Structure, Resources.** This Directorate would evaluate the current and future Reserve Component force structure opportunities against known and anticipated requirements. Engage DOD processes and procedures to invest in relevant force structures that can be afforded, supported and

executed to meet current and future force requirements. It would also be responsible for providing resource management support and advice to the Commander and disseminates budget execution guidance.

The **personal staff group** is directly responsible to the commander. It is comprised of the following four offices: Judge Advocate (JAG) which provides the Commander, subordinate commanders and staff, with accurate, proactive values-based legal advice. The second office is the Public Affairs office (PAO) which serves as the primary Reserve Components spokesperson on major issues. The third is the Inspector General (IG) which is responsible for advising the Commander on the overall welfare and state of discipline of the Command and the last office is the Congressional Legislative Liaison (OCLL). This office serves as the primary point of contact for the Reserve Component (RC) to Members of Congress, their staffs and all relevant committees. It will formulate, coordinate, and supervise policies and programs on the RC's relations with Congress.

The **special staff group** provides technical and tactical matters, e.g., comptroller, Chaplain- Provide strategic oversight in the execution of comprehensive and dynamic religious support for Soldiers and Families, Surgeon- Will serve as the principle advisor to the Commander and will develop and assess policies, projects, and initiatives related to health affairs within the Reserve Component.

This option offers a number of immediate advantages. The headquarters would provide a nucleus around which a Joint Task Force can be structured for domestic catastrophes. It would provide a clear chain of command as well as the staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support joint operations for the Reserve Components. It would utilize

funding already available to their perspective reserve components. It is also a low-cost option as it would be manned by existing resources. The proposed JRCC headquarters would incorporate assets from each RC headquarters in Washington, DC; Office, Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), Office, Chief of the Air Force Reserve (AF/RE), and some from the offices of Commander, United States Navy Reserve in Norfolk, VA and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve in New Orleans, LA. Once the various staffs are merged into the JRCC, there will be redundancies within the staff, (resource management, manning, training, etc.). This would provide an opportunity to reduce overhead within the JRCC staff. At face value, this option would reduce redundancies and potentially save millions of dollars. For instance there is a possibility to eliminate multiple command headquarters, i.e. OCAR, AF/RE. Eliminating these headquarters elements could be a significant cost savings. Arguably, cost savings could be realized across a spectrum of areas, for example by consolidating staff functions across staff functions, training, pay systems and equipment into JRCC. A recent study conducted by The Pentagon's Reserve Policy Forces Board (RFPB) recently published a report on the annual cost to the federal government for each active component-member as compared to reserve component members. The annual cost for an active member is \$384,622 as compared to a reserve-component member at \$123,351, almost three times the yearly cost. Although this study focused on the personal costs it is a starting point for determining possible costs savings that a JRCC could bring in consolidating the RCs.⁵¹

It makes perfect sense to establish a Joint Reserve Components Command that will provide for a developmental pathway to advance to the highest levels of command and rank. Further, it will provide substantial access for service in joint positions that is

essential for advancement in today's armed forces, which are currently extremely limited for reserve component officers and senior noncommissioned officers. In this regard, it is imperative that the Navy and Marine Corps move to convert the positions of Commander, Navy Reserve Force (Vice Admiral) and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (Lt General) from active duty to reserve component, as soon as feasibly possible following the stand-up of the Joint Reserve Components Command, in order to provide the opportunity for senior officers of those components to advance all the way to Commander, Joint Reserve Components Command.

Creation of the JRCC would, in time, strengthen partnerships between the reserve components of each Service due to unity of command and could potentially provide the foundation for further restructuring and rebalancing of the Reserve Components. For example under the JRCC, you would recognize efficiencies by consolidating the recruiting and retention functions of the services of the Reserve Components (i.e. Army Reserve-1,661 recruiters embedded with United States Army Recruiting Command and 1,691 retention counselors in the Army Reserve Careers Divisions; National Guard- 5,623 recruiter/retention counselors in its own recruiting and retention force and thousands more among the other Reserve Components) commands. By combining these headquarters commands you would gain cost savings and efficiencies through the consolidation of reserve facilities across the country.

The most significant barriers of this option would be the political aspect of this effort, specifically from the National Guard point of view. Each state will have a vested interest in the potential impacts to their states. Statutes, directives and operating procedures would need to be looked at for any potential issues. Finally cultural

resistance within the Active Component and Reserve Component is probably the major factor of this proposal. Many Soldiers would resist this change, and that could have an impact on short and long term retention and recruiting goals.

Conclusion

With the current economic fiscal constraints the Department of Defense should seriously consider this option with further research. While cost savings are a realistic and important benefit, it is not the primary objective of this proposal. The real advantages are the efficiencies and effectiveness gained in operating one Joint Reserve Component Command. As previously stated, numerous studies and proposals have been conducted in the past aimed at reorganizing and/or merging the reserve forces of the United States military. These studies and proposals have never successfully made a case for a merger. However none of the studies had taken a view at merging the Command Headquarters. There are many reasons for considering this move if you consider clearly identifiable chains-of-command, a singular set of policies, reduction of redundant senior leadership roles, and streamlined management and training. There can be no doubt that today's reserve component forces have earned the right to claim their place as equal partners with the active components as an operational combat force. No longer will they endure the discreditable idea that they are not on the same playing field as their active counterparts. Not only have they provided the essential connection between the civilian populace and the active armed services, they have forged this position in the heat of battle since September 11, 2001.

If this concept is to be implemented additional studies will have to be conducted, particularly to address the optimal level of reserve manpower. This might lead to greater optimization of the JRCC. An outside agency would be able to study whether that would

be feasible. A detailed data-driven cost analysis review is required to provide for the most efficient use of defense resources. A force structure and manpower study is required to identify the makeup of the JRCC headquarters. Finally, a JRCC would possibly provide a foundation for further restructuring and rebalancing of the Reserve Components in keeping with Twenty-First Century doctrine. The Reserve Components will be ready to defend the U.S. and respond to disasters on the home front and abroad when called upon.

Endnotes

¹ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/qdr> (accessed February 23, 2013).

² Clark A. Murdoch, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase II Report*, 49.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), 159.

⁴ CNN Wire Staff, Mullen: *Debt is Top National Security Threat*, CNN Web, Aug 27, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-27/us/debt.security.mullen_1_pentagon-budget-national-debt (accessed February 21, 2013).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ John R. Brinkerhoff, et al., *National Guard and Reserve Participation in Selected Military Operations After 9/11*, (Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2012), 3.

⁷ Jim D. Hill, *"The Minuteman in Peace and War"*, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co, 1964), 7-10.

⁸ Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, Section 8.

⁹ John K. Mahon, *"History of the Militia and the National Guard"*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1983), 14-18.

¹⁰ William H. Riker, *"Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy"*, (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 11.

¹¹ Chapter 25, 1 Statutes 95, (1789) (*repealed* 1790).

¹² Riker, *Soldiers of the States*, 11-20.

¹³ Chapter 33, 1 Statutes, 271, (1792).

- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Riker, *Soldiers of the States*, 21-61.
- ¹⁷ Ch. 25, 1 Stat., 95-96, (1789) (*repealed* 1790).
- ¹⁸ Riker, *Soldiers of the States*, 60-61.
- ¹⁹ Jerry M. Cooper, *"The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia"*, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 10.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 11.
- ²¹ Ibid., 15-18.
- ²² Ibid., 18-19.
- ²³ Ibid., 19-20.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 21-22.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 26-28.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 89.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 97-100.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 109.
- ²⁹ Chapter 196, 32 Statutes, 775, (1903) (*repealed* 1956).
- ³⁰ Hill, *The Minuteman in Peace and War*, 186-189.
- ³¹ Ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775, (1903) (*repealed* 1956).
- ³² Lee S. Harford, *"Warrior Citizens of America"*, (Atlanta, GA: Camp Creek Business Center, 2007), 1-10.
- ³³ US Army Reserve, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar.htm> (accessed 8 March 2013).
- ³⁴ Harford, *"Warrior Citizens of America,"* 1-10.
- ³⁵ Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross, *"Air National Guard at 60: A History"*, (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 2007), 4-6.
- ³⁶ Air Force Reserve Command Home Page, <http://www.afrc.mil> (accessed January 10 2013).

³⁷ United States Navy Reserve Home Page, <http://www.navyreserve.navy.mil> (accessed January 10 2013).

³⁸ United States Marine Forces Reserve Home Page, <http://www.marforres.usmc.mil> (accessed 10 January 10 2013).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Paul M. Beeson, *"The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card"*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for Information Policy Research, 1998), 1.

⁴¹ Joint Organization and Staff Functions, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/chapter_1.pdf (accessed February 18 2013). 1-22

⁴² James H. Kyle, *"The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander"*, (New York: Orion Books, 1990). 283.

⁴³ Paul M. Beeson, *"The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card"*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for Information Policy Research, 1998), 33.

⁴⁴ Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (PL 99-433), Chapter 38, Section 666.

⁴⁵ William G. Morris, "Reserve Response to Search and Rescue Operations Following Hurricane Katrina," *Disaster Recovery Journal*, July 6, 2010, <http://www.drj.com/articles/online-exclusive/reserve-response-to-search-and-rescue-operations-following-hurricane-katrina.html> (accessed March 6, 2013).

⁴⁶ Christopher M. Clayton, *National Emergency Preparedness and Response: Improving for Incidents of National Significance*, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College), 4.

⁴⁷ Morris, "Reserve Response".

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ U.S. Depart of Defense Home Page, <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=118975> (accessed February 24 2013).

⁵⁰ Navy Times Staff, *Logistics shuffle: Handling combat cargo in a traffic-jammed port means learning to compromise*, Navy Web, Jun 21, 2004, <http://www.navytimes.com/legacy/new/0-NAVYPAPER-2993033.php>

⁵¹ Reserve Forces Policy Board: Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy, Final Report to Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, January 7, 2013.